The ASTM program was promoted as a multi-group consensus activity, where there would be a compromise solution formed considering the many group-particular objectives. The FAA was to monitor progress rather than promote any favored solutions. It didn't happen. There is no way that the ultralight flyers could have identified with the elimination of pilot training using two-place ultralight aircraft and USUA, ASC, or EAA trained and tested instructors. There is no real need for the present thousands of ultralight instructors to re-qualify (most will not make the attempt) through an FAA certified instructor program. Most ultralight instructors teach as a part of their hobby and not as a vocation, or in contrast with many new FAA CFI'S, to build log time in aircraft as part of upgrading to higher licensing levels. There is no way these existing ultralight instructors would have agreed that it's a good idea for the waiver to FAR103, allowing pilot training two-place ultralights, to be eliminated or that their thousands of dollar investments in thousands of such aircraft will be lost, and their vehicles become lawn ornaments (illegal aircraft) unless they are examined and converted to LSA's (at several hundred more dollars expense and effort). "Light Sport Aircraft" and "Sport Pilot" are aliens gestated inside the body of the ultralight movement, and have broken through its skin as monsters to cripple and devour its participants.

The first Light Sport Aircraft certified by the FAA is manufactured in the Czech Republic. Of the 40+ currently certified LSA planes, more than three quarters are of foreign design and manufacture. The ASTM LSA consensus committee carefully considered foreign aircraft regulations and their applicability to possible LSA standards, so it should be of little surprise that many existing foreign designs easily conform to the new FAA certification requirements. In contrast, few American ultralight offerings are either a good design match to the specifications or are produced with the documentation or manufacturing controls already required by foreign governments (and the new LSA regulations). There is no parallelism between the existing FAA regulations for single and two place ultralights and those created for the new Light Sport Aircraft category.

Like the advantage the OPEC oil crisis gave to foreign small car producers in the auto market, the new LSA regulations open the field to foreign designs, without much in the way of viable American products being available. If this advantage is allowed to continue, the unique market dominated here by US ultralight manufacturers will evaporate.

Ultralight manufacturing is done by small producers, and in many cases Mom and Pop operators. However, it is a high technology business requiring knowledge in the areas of aeronautics, power-plants, materials, manufacturing, testing, marketing, training, cash flow, and other critical disciplines. The participants in this field are technical innovators and entrepreneurs. As the engineering and manufacturing of Light Sport Aircraft bases itself in Europe, the American involvement will swing to sales and service.

As Rutgers Professor Emeritus Daniel Shanefield pointed out in a "Crosstalk" note, America's global advantage is engineering creativity and freedom of thought. The New Sport Aircraft regulations not only greatly reduce the need for the innovation and creativity shown by current ultralight manufacturers, but match the defining requirements to existing foreign rather than American designs. As we struggle to maintain our domestic manufacturing base, the government should not promote arbitrary regulations that hobble our American creative advantage, manufacturing base, and existing product support structure. The loss of product manufacturing also means the propellers, instruments, brakes, paint, plastic, upholstery, metal sheet and tubes, fasteners, glues, cables, seatbelts, hinges, lights, manuals, crating, etc. will be foreign produced. The punching, machining, welding, painting, baking, and other manufacturing equipment is another lost market. Maybe Small Business cannot save America, but government should not shy from improving the possibilities. The social and economic effect of regulation should be a basic consideration.

The FAA is chartered to assure the safety of air travelers and the general public, not the economic environment. However, there are no glaring real safety concerns generated by the existing ultralight activity. Ultralights have few things to fail, and many "soft failure" opportunities if any problem occurs. FAA officials have taken advantage of numerous photo-opts to fly in two-place training craft with ultralight instructors at national air-shows like "Oshkosh" in Wisconsin and "Sun 'n Fun" in Florida. It is unlikely that if ultralighting posed a risk to them or the thousands of show spectators, that they would have participated in the activity. The evolution of the ultralight sport has shown that, to the surprise of many, unregulated manufacturers and instructors from the self-regulated sport's ranks can produce a safe widely available product and training base. Until LSA, the ultralight base was increasing each year, while according to the AOPA figures, the private pilot registration was decreasing. However, the ultralight expansion was not cannibalizing the existing private pilot base, but was chiefly attracting individuals new to the sport. In the false name of public safety, regulation should not be used to force Ultralighters to swell the private pilot ranks!

The new Sport Pilot Regulations require the generation of two new classes of FAA certified inspectors for the examination of prospective LSA pilots and aircraft. Much of the manufacturing control operation will be left to the relatively yet undefined self (manufacturer's) certification of proposed manufacturing procedures. There are ten to twenty thousand ultralight single-place aircraft operational, most of which do not meet the F103 original or present (unchanged) ultralight vehicle requirements. "Fat" ultralights must be certified as LSA. Expectedly, there are a similar number of ultralight pilots who are being required to acquire an LSA pilot license to continue to operate these LSA registered aircraft. There are thousands of two-place ultralight training vehicles with their currently qualified instructors, who were trained under USUA, USHGA, ASC, and EAA training programs approved by the FAA. If these pilots were to take advantage of their previous flight hours and avoid the expense of duplicating student flight hours when converting to an LSA license, they had to do so before February 2007. This was to be done with one of the newly trained LSA FAA certified instructors in an aircraft already certified for LSA operations. There weren't enough instructor or aircraft resources available to come close to handling the potential need by that date, or even now. By January 2008, no two-place ultralight not completing LSA conversion requirements can be flown.

There were nowhere near enough LSA instructors or LSA aircraft available nationally to allow any significant portion of the ultralight pilots eligible to be credited for past experience, to complete the necessary training and testing in time to meet the FAA designated deadline. Either the schedulers did not run the numbers, or they had no serious expectations that the expressed intentions could be accomplished. For those ultralight pilots that have been successful in this conversion process, the $500 to $1000 cost for electronic tests, LSA aircraft rental (can't use your ultralight), and examiner's fees and expenses for the required oral exam and flight check-ride raise questions at least of cost effectiveness. When it's the only game in town, or unfortunately in the instructor's town somewhat more distant, that's the price you pay.

THE CHARGE OF THE ULTRALIGHT BRIGADE

The deadline for converting existing non-103-conforming single place vehicles or two-place training vehicles to LSA certified aircraft is the end of the year. The total monetary cost to individuals for just the examiners time to make the required inspections and handle the paperwork would be in the millions of dollars. Moving the tens of thousands of vehicles successfully through this process requires the planning, dedication, and organization of a military invasion. The current logistic and cost problems do not bode well for the expectation of a high level of conversion.

Most single place ultralights are now operated at higher weights, higher speeds, or with more fuel capacity than allowed by F103. The intentions of experienced users were not to defy the regulations, but to operate a safer less marginal vehicle in a more rewarding environment. Ultralight participants are yet to be convinced that a move to the Light Sport mode will produce any measurable improvement in safety for pilots, the flying public, or the general citizenry. Because ultralighting has in the past fed many participants into general aviation, making the ultralight sport less attractive to the uninitiated may accelerate rather than arrest the loss of private pilot registrations. Success may be failure.

WHERE'S THE BEEF

As was said, there are no real present or foreseeable safety problems that stand to be solved by the new Light Sport Regulations. Likely, the favoring of a current auto driver's license over a medical examination will help stem the loss of aging registered pilots, but it can't be promoted as an obvious safety improvement move. Pressing Ultralighters into the LSA ranks will increase the figures for licensed pilot based organizations like the AOPA and EAA (even FAA) and those entities responsible for checking pilots and aircraft initially and periodically. That should not have been the primary intent of new regulations. Also, unfortunately, these organizations do not appear sensitive to the effects of transferring design and manufacturing activities out of the country. In fact, the ASTM LSA Committee Chairman/EAA Vice President (same person) participated in a team presentation in China concerning manufacturer's LSA specifications. With strong European LSA participation, do we really need the Chinese?

WHY WORRY

While there may be some opportunity here for LSA manufacturing in the future, there is practically no competitive US-LSA base to be impacted by creating regulations that favor foreign producers. Proponents tout the new LSA regulations as the vehicle to arrest the declining private pilot base and faded single engine certified aircraft business. There are yet few active detractors. For the nation, any economic loss, if foreign producers continue their domination of the market, would be relatively insignificant compared to the volume and impact of the many other manufacturing jobs moving overseas. So don't rain on the parade. However, there is already a serious impact in the ultralight area. The leading ultralight organizations like the USUA and the ASC have lost significantly because, as they have tried to support the new regulations, many members have felt abandoned. Through these groups' past promotion, education, and training activities, they have been responsible for moving more new people into recreational flying activities than the EAA's million free rides or the FAA's earlier failed Recreational Pilot offering. But, current ultralight instructors are letting their training authorizations lapse, and many will fail to convert to the more regimented Light Sport Aircraft Instructor certification. The value of two-place trainers has eroded, and, without conversion, will go to zero. Prospective ultralight students see no need for completing a formal training and testing program, since basic operations under F103 don't require it. Less participants mean tight finances for these supporting organizations.

The ultralight manufacturers are seeing zero interest in the two place ultralight area. Also potential purchasers considering single place F103 compatible vehicles are hesitant to purchase a vehicle lacking the amenities of brakes, solid doors, or more than a single cylinder engine. They are equally reluctant to spend $10,000 to $20,000 on a safer kit which, when finished, will be in violation of previously un-enforced FAA restrictions. They ponder and wait, or buy a motorcycle.

SO NOW WHAT

There is no pressing need to disrupt the very successful ultralight vehicle development and training program to promote Light Sport Aircraft or private pilot registrations. If there are to be changes, make them to the current training programs and ultralight regulations. Enhance the safety and acceptance of F103 by making the realistic changes for weight and fuel limits repeatedly requested by the ultralight community. Don't eliminate the FAA waiver that supports the two-place ultralight training program. There are presently more ultralight pilots than there will be for some time, if ever, in the LSA ranks. If it's not broken, don't fix it, and with ultralighting, if it's not broken, don't break it. Let the general aviation industry run with the LSA regulations, and bet on the sales business or Cessna, if they look to LSA as their salvation, but take the viable ultralight baby out of the bathwater.

YOU AND WHAT ARMY

The FAA does not suffer fools or even candid suggestions from the enlightened citizenry. Perhaps the 2007 FAA reorganization overseen by Congress presents an opportunity to get their attention sufficiently enough to have them consider reviewing the detrimental effects of arbitrary deadlines, insufficient field organization, the unforeseen consequences of regulatory changes, and the economic impact on some Red White and Blue struggling high technology widespread small business operations.

Help is needed to prevent the American invented ultralight sport from being sacrificed in an attempt to stop the pilot erosion in the light aircraft area. The most likely cause of that erosion is over-regulation and its negative effect on interest, innovation, and prices. All those associated with aviation support the efforts to take positive measures to promote flying and improve safety. Stifling innovation and raising costs for ultralight type vehicles through unconstructive regulation will cripple the one successful area of activity without helping the other. If creativity is an American strength, we should not handicap our advantage with old school regulatory dogma. If you agree, can you get us some relief?

PS:

The ultralighting originator, John Moody, recently busted up his legs while demonstrating a replica of his original vehicle. It was surely F103 compatible.